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According to the paratactic theory of indirect discourse, a report in the 
form ‘A said that p’ is best regarded as an utterance of two type sentences, 
‘A said that’ and ‘p’,  in which the word ‘that’ is a demonstrative pronoun 
somehow relating to the subsequent (non-assertive) utterance of ‘ p ’ .  
Different versions of the theory, however, differ markedly over the nature 
of this relation, and over the character of the item which the putative 
demonstrative designates. In the paper which brought the theory to wide- 
spread attention, Davidson (1 969) construed the demonstrative as 
denoting the speech event which is the subsequent utterance of ‘p’ .  Accord- 
ingly, he construed the initial claim ‘A said that’ as expressing a 
relationship between a person A and an event ti - a relation that obtains iff 
u and some utterance of A’s ‘make samesayers’ of the reporter and A. 
Against this, Ian McFetridge (1976) raised what has come to be called the 
‘counting problem’. Our actual practice of making indirect reports, he 
claimed, is littered with examples which show that the designata of the 
grammatical objects of the verb ‘to say’ (the things said, as we might call 
them) cannot be particular utterances. And he went on to develop a variant 
paratactic theory in which the demonstrative is taken to be a device of 
‘deferred ostension’ - denoting, not the ensuing utterance itself, but the 
proposition which that utterance expresses, or binds.’ On this view, ‘to 
say’ expresses a relation between speakers and the things expressed by 
utterances, and not between speakers and utterances themselves. The most 
recent contribution to this intrafamilial wrangle has come in these pages 
from Richard Holton (1996), who disputes the whole cogency of 
McFetridge’s attack on Davidson. This note is devoted to explaining why 
his counter is unconvincing. 
McFetridge undertook to produce cases in which the designata of the 
demonstrative (the things said) cannot be taken to be speech events; and in 
so doing, he concentrated upon examples in which there is an explicit 
claim to the effect that the thing said on one occasion of utterance (the 
proposition thereby expressed) is (or is not) identical with the thing said 
on another. As Holton rightly observes, such examples do not tax David- 
son’s strategy of reconstruing predicates - a strategy already visible in his 
For the difference, see McFetridge 1976 and my 1993. The latter article proposes a 
new strain of McFetridge’s variant theory, as does Wiggins 1992. 
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account of ‘to say’. For even if we accept that it makes sense to say (for 
example) ‘The proposition that Quine is older than Davidson is the very 
same thing as the proposition that Davidson is younger than Quine’, and 
subject this claim to a paratactic treatment, it is apparently open to David- 
son to understand the term ‘proposition’ as a count noun applying to a 
certain kind of utterance, and to construe the entire claim as true iff the 
reporter’s utterances of ‘Quine is older than Davidson’ and ‘Davidson is 
younger than Quine’ make him a samesayer with himself. However, as 
Holton recognizes, explicit identity statements of this form are not the only 
cases which may reflect identity or diversity as between things said: 
[There] do seem to be other times when the explicit quantifiers of 
English do not range over utterances, but over whatever it is that the 
utterances are utterances of: 
(12) Galileo said only one thing that night, but he said it over 
and over again. 
Obviously, we can’t understand the quantifier ‘only one thing’ as rang- 
ing over utterances, since if (12) is true Galileo made many utterances. 
So in what sense is it true that he said only one thing? ... A natural way 
of construing (12) is to think of the quantifier as ranging over propo- 
sitions (1996: 48). 
But, Holton argues, Davidson should remain unperturbed by such cases. It 
is no surprise, he says, 
that Davidson will not be able to take sentences like (12) at face value. 
Any theorist of ordinary language who eschews propositions will be 
in the same position ... . The interest ... lies in determining whether 
he has the resources to give convincing paraphrases. 
Here Davidson is not badly placed. Given his analysis of speech 
ascriptions, he already has the samesayer relation. The obvious move 
is to paraphrase apparent quantification over propositions in terms of 
this relation. Admittedly, this will require straying some way from the 
surface syntax, but Davidson is already committed to that. Thus (12) 
can be represented as 
(13) Galileo made many utterances that night, and (tlx)(tly)(if x 
is amongst those utterances, and y is amongst those utter- 
ances, then x and y made Galileo a samesayer with himself) 
(op. cit., 49). 
But, as I shall argue, serious problems lie concealed within the phrase ‘has 
the resources to give convincing paraphrases’. 
In order to see what these might be, it helps to step back for a moment 
and consider the aims of the enterprise to which the paratactic theory is 
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supposed to contribute. That enterprise is, of course, the construction of 
an adequate semantical theory for English, where such a theory will be 
adequate if it ‘explicitly states something knowledge of which would 
suffice for interpreting [i.e. assigning the right truth conditions to, English] 
utterances’ (Davidson 1976: 171). As Davidson remarks in another place, 
the construction of such a theory for a natural language will ‘almost 
certainly divide into two stages. In the first stage, truth will be character- 
ized, not for the whole language, but for a carefully gerrymandered part of 
the language. This part, though no doubt clumsy grammatically, will 
contain an infinity of sentences which exhaust the expressive power of the 
whole language. The second part [= stage?] will match each of the remain- 
ing sentences to one or (in the case of ambiguity) more than one of the 
sentences for which truth has been characterized’ (1973: 133). 
To which of these parts do Holton’s sentences belong? It is fairly clear 
that (12) cannot belong to the first part. Davidson’s truth theories are not 
only homophonic, but also generate proofs of T-theorems that reflect the 
structure of the quoted sentences. Accordingly, a theory of this kind which 
applied to sentences like (12) would involve the theorist in quantifying 
over the things said on occasions of utterances, as well as the utterances 
themselves; such quantification would not be confined to the speakers the 
theorist was trying to interpret. Since Davidson aspires to avoid quantifi- 
cation of this kind, sentences like (12) must belong to the second part of 
English, and as such they must derive their truth conditions from some 
anchor sentence in the first part. This anchor cannot be exactly (13), for 
( 1  3) is not a sentence of English. I shall, however, suppose that Holton 
would be prepared to advance as such an anchor an English rendering of 
(1 3) - as it might be ( 3  3’), ‘Galileo made many utterances that night, and 
any two among them make him a samesayer with himself‘. For only in this 
way will his remark about paraphrases constitute a defence of Davidson’s 
position. It should be noted, however, that this gives to the notion of same- 
saying a greater role in the elaboration of the paratactic theory than 
Davidson himself accords to it. In his book, it appears only in an informal 
gloss on the notion of saying (see 1969: 104, n.14). In Holton’s, it figures 
in the fragment of English to which the truth theory directly applies. 
If, though, the total theory is to state something sufficient for interpret- 
ing the utterances that English speakers actually produce, it will have to 
state something sufficient for effecting the right match between sentences 
in the two parts2 That is to say, it will have to include rules ofparaphrase 
which pair sentences outside the semantical kernel with those the seman- 
tics is capable of treating ‘at face value’, i.e. those to which the truth theory 
applies. In the present case, then, we shall need rules for matching English 
sentences which involve apparent quantification over propositions with 
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others that do not. What is more, if they are to be of any interest to David- 
son, these rules must be of a particular kind. A completed semantical 
theory is supposed to ‘demonstrate in a persuasive way that the language, 
though it consists in an indefinitely large number of sentences, can be 
comprehended by a creature with finite powers’ (1969: 94), an explana- 
tory onus from which Davidson derives a requirement of finite 
axiomatizability on the truth theory which applies to the gerrymandered 
core. But if it is reasonable to impose such a requirement on the core, it 
must also be reasonable to impose a similar constraint on the rules of para- 
phrase; otherwise we should be left without a ‘persuasive’ demonstration 
of how a finite training could have enabled us to know which sentence(s) 
in the core give the truth conditions of those that we actually use. In any 
event, the general point will be clear. Holton does not provide any rules of 
paraphrase and, for so long as they remain absent, the intuitive acceptabil- 
ity of (13) or (13’) as a paraphrase of (12) - the fact that it is ‘convincing’ 
- should not blind us to the fact that (12) remains outside the pale of 
sentences for which the eschewer of propositions is capable of providing a 
proper semantics. No such objection, however, besets the defender of the 
variant paratactic theory. Called upon to answer the question ‘What is the 
word “it” doing in sentence (12)?’, he can reply that it is playing its famil- 
iar role of variable (in this case, one bound by the numerical quantifier 
‘only one’) - just as the pronoun ‘him’ does in ‘Galileo insulted only one 
cardinal that night, but he insulted him over and over again’. (For the 
‘What is this word doing here?’ question, see Davidson 1969: 94.) 
Is there any prospect of finding such rules as Holton’s account requires? 
The task is, of course, one for him, but it does seem utterly daunting. It is 
hard enough to articulate general rules that subsume the paraphrases in 
Holton’s own short paper, let alone construct an effective method for para- 
phrasing every English sentence involving apparent quantification over 
things said. Moreover, the fact that we know that (13)  and (13’) are para- 
phrases of (12) is no argument for supposing that there must be rules of the 
appropriate kind. For the explanation might be that we first apply to (12) 
the knowledge made explicit by a variant, McFetridgean paratactic theory, 
and then deduce that utterances of (12) and (13’) are true in precisely the 
same circumstances via the general principle that a single proposition will be 
repeatedly uttered precisely on occasions in which there are many utterances 
See Davidson 1967: 123: ‘The ideal implicit in the paper [= “The logical form of 
action sentences”] is a theory that spells out every element of logical form in every 
English sentence about actions. I dream of a theory that makes the transition from 
the ordinary idiom to canonical notation purely mechanical, and a canonical 
notation rich enough to capture, in its dull and explicit way, every difference and 
connection considered the business of the theory of meaning’ (emphasis added). 
250 IAN RUMFITT 
which render their utterers samesayers. A congruence of truth conditions, 
provable on the basis of semantic principles, is certainly an exigent condi- 
tion for paraphrase; but the suggested explanation of how we come to 
know that (13’) paraphrases (12) is evidently unavailable to a theorist who 
refuses to quantify over propositions in formulating his truth theory. 
To be sure, a proponent of the variant paratactic theory incurs obliga- 
tions that Davidson himself avoids. In particular, he must explain what it 
is for two utterances to express the same proposition, and how it is that the 
putatively demonstrative ‘that’ secures reference to one such. I have tried 
to show how Davidson’s own notion of an interpretative truth theory helps 
us to discharge these obligations (1 993). While that explanation could 
doubtless be improved, its prospects - and the prospects for a completed 
paratactic semantics along ‘variant’ lines - are surely better than those of 
its nominalistic rival, which must live in hope of a supplementation of 
which we have, as yet, not the slightest inkling. 
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